BEIRUT: BASIC CITY DATA

City, Country, Location:
Beirut, Lebanon, Eastern Mediterranean

Population:
Municipal Beirut: 800.000
Metropolitan Beirut: 1.5 million

Area:
Municipal Beirut: 18 km²
Metropolitan Beirut: 67 km²



Mazen Kerbaj and **Jana Traboulsi** were invited to comment on the theme of security in Beirut. Traboulsi's illustration (right) comes in response to Kerbaj's.

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***Diwan** is a collaborative research platform initiated and curated by Philipp Misselwitz and Can Altay which brings together leading academics, practitioners and experts from the field of architecture and urban studies in Turkey and the Middles East. Diwan aims to provoke a critical discourse on the current trends that are radically transforming cities in the region, focusing on voluntary and involuntary forms of urban exclusion and urban practices that confront, subvert and transgress a reality of growing spatial and social polarization. Through conducting new field work, collecting reflections, thoughts, ideas, and utopias, Diwan also hopes to act as a trigger and nucleus for a multitude of regional projects and collaborations—and ultimately provide a unique opportunity to generate links, networks, and collaborations in a region that is geographically united with shared histories and numerous cultural traditions, which is also dealing with very similar challenges yet remains divided and fragmented.

Diwan publications include:
Istanbul—Living in Voluntary and Involuntary Exclusion (edited by Eda Ünlü-Yücesoy and Tansel Korkmaz with Yaşar Adanalı, Can Altay and Philipp Misselwitz)
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BEIRUT MAPPING SECURITY

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01—EDITORIAL

BY MONA FAWAZ, MONA HARB AND AHMAD GHARBIEH

The assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri on February 14, 2005 precipitated in Lebanon, and especially in Greater Beirut, a process of militarization and compartmentalization of space to an extent unseen since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990. The sequence of assassinations and assassination attempts that ensued gradually legitimized the proliferation of security systems in order to protect a few politicians and political institutions against a criminalized "public". Since then, a sharp polarization of sectarian divisions and their degeneration into street fights in 2008 also lead to the deployment of police and military personnel in a number of locations identified as "hot spots" where riot-control measures were deemed necessary. Thus, temporary checkpoints, closed roads, 'no parking' signs, security cameras, speed bumps, sand bags, tanks, and other aspects of the security deployment apparatus have become familiar elements of the cityscape, which almost every dweller has to navigate daily. Banks, malls, and large department stores introduced screening measures such as bag searches, electronic detectors, and car inspections. A number of buildings such as the main headquarters of political parties, central police stations, public agencies, and the United Nations Headquarters were turned into bunkers, separated from their surroundings by layers of concrete barriers and barbed wire. It very well seems that the militarization of urban space increasingly denounced by social and urban theorists [1] has caught-up with the Lebanese capital city.

As impelling as it is, the recent political turmoil cannot be decried as the sole reason behind the proliferation of security enforcement practices in the city. These practices indeed are rooted in the history of Lebanon's civil war, when Beirut was fragmented into well-delineated territories, each controlled by a sectarian militia. In fact, a number of the current security arrangements date back to the civil war, especially so-called areas of "self-rule" where security is handled by semi-autonomous, militarized bodies. This is the case, for example, of al-Dahiyah, Beirut's southern suburb (the consolidated territory of Hezbollah [2]), and of Palestinian refugee camps throughout the country.

Security concerns have also been emblematic of the post-civil war reconstruction, especially in terms of the privatization of public security and its deployment to protect the rich against other contenders to the spaces that they have declared as their territories. In that context, the reconstruction of Beirut's historic core in the early 1990's by the private real-estate company Solidere and its transformation into a downtown entertainment area for the very rich is particularly emblematic of the deployment of surveillance and the control of public spaces. It was indeed there that the first comprehensive private security program was established to control access to major public spaces in the city. Beirut downtown's project became eventually the emblem of the neoliberal urban and economic strategies that largely determined the city's development during the next years, yielding a politics of marginalization based on class divisions. This trend eventually continued to define the development of the city that has now acquired a well-defined landscape of privately secured zones where the city's upper income dwellers have established their territories. These consist of buildings (e.g. malls, shopping centers, boutiques, restaurants, cafes, high-end residential towers, sea resorts) and infrastructure systems (e.g. highway networks, airport, seaports) that cater to their needs. In these areas, private security systems have also deployed their visible architecture of exclusion that protects the 'private' reserves where the well-heeled can wander undisturbed. (➪ map H).

The two security regimes—the one protecting the 'politician' and the one protecting the 'high-income city dweller'—often intersect in their mechanisms of operation, as capital and politics often collude along similar lines of interest. ⇨

Student project/intervention
"This is a residential area"
by Hamed Sinno, 2008.
A commentary on the proliferation of security measures using the language of the official signage.

➪ For example, the security apparatus of the March 14 headquarters in the area of Koraytem (➪ map E) blends private and public security systems in closely coordinated ways. Security regimes also deploy a relatively unified range of architectural elements and measures: high-end shoppers and political actors hide behind the same type of barbed wire while each claims protection from the other—without, again, excluding the possibility for a same actor to move regularly across categories. But, what makes Beirut's architecture of security perhaps also different from other contexts are the blatant and invasive ways in which these mechanisms have been operating with no efforts to conceal and/or minimize their impacts and visibility. We are hence far from the high-tech/relatively transparent technologies deployed in other capital cities of the so-called developed world.[3] The security apparatus takes precedence over all other priorities in the Lebanese capital, especially in its municipal area where, as illustrated in our maps, no neighborhood escapes the trend unscathed. The main exception to this visible architecture of fear as a means of security in Beirut are the popular and religiously homogeneous neighborhoods of municipal Beirut and its suburbs where security is often insured by the dwellers who organize patrols and surveillance rounds to protect "their" community, especially in times of conflict (see for instance, the case of Tariq al-Jdideh analyzed by M. Kaabour, ➪ 07f). Among these areas, al-Dahiyah (Beirut's southern suburbs) stands out for its unique and highly organized surveillance system in the hands of Hezbollah. There, security—especially since 2006[4]—relies on a set of relatively transparent mechanisms (such as patrolling) and dwellers are integrated in the hierarchies of the security system and required to scrutinize and report "suspicious" activities. The organization of neighborhood security is facilitated by a history of spatial production during the Lebanese civil war which turned zones in the vicinities of the Lebanese capital city into relatively homogeneous religious territories. Hence most dwellers in al-Daihyah are aligned with Hezbollah's political and social priorities and happily contribute to its security system (see the case of Haret Hreik, ➪ 07e) while most dwellers in Tariq al-Jadidah are aligned with Hariri's political orientation.

Finally, one cannot profile security concerns in Beirut without documenting how outside threats —most specifically Israeli attacks, reconfigure the city's spaces. During those times, Lebanon operates under a "crisis status" whereby, on the one hand, large sections of the Beirut's population flee the capital to the surrounding mountains and abroad while the city becomes a refuge for people escaping the Israeli shelling of villages and towns in South Lebanon and South Beirut. In this process, many buildings change functions (e.g. schools turned into temporary shelters) and new divisions are generated between areas hospitable to refugees and areas that aren't.[5]

The various security mechanisms in Beirut ultimately consolidate in the formation of an anxious cityscape with varying levels of intensity: hot spots—the symbolic centers of political control—where the map reflects an intense concentration of security elements, and diffuse areas where the presence of the security apparel becomes comparatively diluted—nonetheless almost always present. Security is furthermore a dynamic and continuously changing concept. It operates within temporal regimes of 'crisis time'[6] and 'normal time' as well as night/day, etc. during which the cordoned-off areas spill over to their surroundings, including in their bunkers additional streets and blocks, while additional "hot spots" are created and neighborhood-level organization of security patrols and surveillance are deployed. This is why the mapping we present should be taken with a grain of salt: we provide one representation, mapped as accurately as possible, however valid for the time and duration of the actual survey. It reflects mechanisms and processes at a particular moment rather than a permanent reality.

Security mechanisms affect deeply the way the city is practiced and lived. They redefine what is acceptable and what is not in the balance between infringement on individual civil liberties, on the one hand, and acceptable levels of threat, on the other. They also reverse the private/public divide, allowing private control over the use of public spaces. They also establish new social hierarchies defined according to users' competence and the various forms of capital they can activate in this new order. Hence, the implications of this security deployment varies considerably across users, depending on one's position in the local social, gender, moral, national, and class hierarchies. This is why our investigation extends to document, map out, and contrast the effects of these security systems on individual users selected from different social group and the way each of these users negotiates them in her/his daily practices. Our findings indicate for instance that foreign migrant workers whose free circulation in urban space is itself constructed as suspicious[7] experience the security system as an oppressive presence which alters their movements, rendering certain areas inaccessible and limiting their presence to well-defined cloisters primarily at the outskirts (➪ maps J1–10). For others, however, the security system may be a source of disturbance but also security against petty crime and assault, as argued by this middle-income single woman who looks at the fortification of her neighborhood with mixed feelings… Others still described them as understandable measures of self-defense, especially when it comes to the supporters of a particular figure or movement. As researchers, we do not leave the scene unscathed ourselves: visits to police stations and private militia headquarters constitute part and parcel of our fieldwork experiences, whether it is to secure permits to allow us to conduct fieldwork or in interrogation sessions after the fact, when our presence and activities were deemed suspicious by the authorities on the ground. The risks also involve losing more than a research assistant, as happened early on in the course of this mapping when one of our assistants, confronted to the scrutiny of the police force, rapidly opted to change professions! Ultimately—researcher or not—each urban dweller develops a competence for reading and navigating the security systems, which is added to the panoply of skills needed to survive the city.

Despite severe impacts on the city's practices and business activities, security systems have seldom been discussed in the local media. It is as if, public opinion has accepted their proliferation as a natural mechanism of self defense without discussing their implications… This is why the voices of the students, contributors and artists included in this paper are particularly important: they reflect some of the (only) dissent that we have encountered in the local scene. Yet, at a critical level, we argue that security systems confront us with a redefinition of what is meant by the urban, one that reverses perhaps decades or theoretical debates about the potentialities of the city and its ability to generate innovative forms of social synergies and cultural or political action.[8] Instead, we are faced with a formulation of the city centered on fear, an anxious urbanism that strongly recalls discourses of the early industrial era that we thought decades of critical urban theory had buried forever. Practices of urban planning, in turn, shift their concerns towards the control and subjugation of individual bodies whereby citizens are reconstructed as potential threats to be curtailed rather than voices to be heard and included. "City air makes one free," argued once a Weber enthusiastically reflecting on the potentiality of the urban.[9] Beirut seems today far from actualizing this prediction. ❑

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1—An early discussion of these themes can be seen in S. Graham (ed.), *Cities, War, and Terrorism*, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

2—For a detailed history of the production of the Southern Suburbs of Beirut in relation to Hezbollah, see M. Harb, "Deconstructing Hezbollah and its Suburbs", Merip (242): 12–17, 2007.

3—J. Coaffee in S. Graham (2004) op cit, for example, describes London's "Ring of Steel" where despite a number of visible elements (e.g. plastic cones), the thrust of the security deployment consists of high-tech transparent elements.

4—This is when the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon led to the demolition of the entire headquarters of Hezbollah, once an urban fortress, in the neighborhood of Haret Hreik and wreaked havoc in the residential and commercial fabric of this area.

5—The last large scale Israeli attack dates back to 2006. Prior to that, we can list by way of example 1993 and 1996 as well as the Israeli occupation of Beirut in 1982.

6—Crisis time can be related to particular incidents (street fights, a fiery political speech, etc.) and/or events, such as elections. In that context, the map of Beirut in June 2009 is particularly relevant.

7—For an articulation of the position of migrant workers in space, ↔ A. Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*, (NC: Duke UP, 2007).

8—We are here, of course, chiefly referring to the work of H. Lefebvre in, for example, his manifesto *The Right to the City* (1968), published in English in E. Kofman and E. Lebas, *Writings on Cities*, (MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), pp. 147–159.

9—M. Weber, *The City*, (Illinois: The Free Press, 1958).

02—GUEST EDITORIAL

BY STEPHEN GRAHAM

The term 'security' is crucially important because it is at once ubiquitous and ill-defined within the contemporary transformations of cities. On the one hand, Georgio Agemben has argued convincingly that a key feature of contemporary shifts towards states of political exception is the way the imperative of 'security' now "imposes itself of the basic principle of state activity." "What used to be one among several decisive measures of public administration until the first half of the twentieth century," he continues, "now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation." Thus urban political and cultural spheres as diverse as architecture, urban design, social policy, immigration management, transport management, infrastructure policy, spatial planning, public health, utility management and of course urban everyday life become utterly infused in many cities with complex discourses of 'security.' And yet, simultaneously, very little attention falls on what this term might actually mean. What actually *is* urban security? Security of what? Security from what? Where are the spatial imaginaries of malign presence and threat against which the urban is reconstituted against? And what threats and risks are systematically denied within such imaginations?

The power and threat of urban securitization to truly democratic imaginations of urban life stems from the vague, all-encompassing and self-perpetuating nature of the discourses that sustain it. Who, after all, is going to argue in favor of urban *in*security? Sociologists of knowledge use the term 'interpretive flexibility' to highlight the way certain terms, whilst gaining ubiquitous presence and complete normalization, at the same time remain ill-defined and vague as their power derives from both their endless circulation and normalization, and the way their meaning can be imagined and interpreted in a myriad of ways.

As we can see from the wonderful work by Mona Fawaz and colleagues in Beirut, the critical point here is that the circulation of vague discourses of urban securitization has very real and very important political, cultural and material efects on cities. For example, dominant elites and power holders, and corporate political economies, are often able to benefit from the ubiquity of urban security discourses in a wide variety of ways. Whole varieties of resistance and social movements can be bundled together as 'terrorist' and radically de-legitimized at a stroke. Legal and civil rights of assembly, due process and transparency, achieved through decades or centuries of democratic struggle, can be systematically denied and trampled. Political discourse can be 'chilled'. Intrusive and authoritarian policies and surveillance systems can be introduced and civilian policy domains militarized. Urban landscapes can be re-engineered into militarized camps separated by check points and passage-points demanding that travelers demonstrate a priori legitimacy before gaining access. Finally, convergent complexes of surveillance, corrections, military, defense, entertainment, architectural, engineering, and corrections can fuse with political elites and feed at the trough of burgeoning public monies removed from social, welfare or health domains without democratic scrutiny. Paradoxically, as this can happen when very real insecurities—against car traffic, domestic violence, rape, environmental collapse, climate change—are systematically obfuscated within urban political discussion.

In what follows, the Beirut team provides an extraordinary overview of how ubiquitous discourses of 'security' become manifest in very real, rapid and dramatic urban transformations. As an exemplar of the complex politics and materialities of urban securitisation, Beirut deserves our detailed scrutiny. ❑

Stephen Graham *is a Professor of Human Geography at the University of Durham in the UK.*

Reference

↔ Agamben, G. (2002), "Security and terror", *Theory and Event*, 5:4, 2002, 1–2.

03—NEGOTIATING THE MAPPING ADVANTAGE

BY AHMAD GHARBIEH

Maps conceal certain realities only in order to make visible a set of connections otherwise unseen through the lived experience of the spaces we occupy. In this sense, maps serve specific interests, and what they hide can acquire the virtue of making discernible what they show. This selectivity in the mapping process is furthermore responsible for formulating the general interest of the map, its theme, its purpose, and ultimately its unavoidable bias.

In the case of mapping security measures—and their corresponding experiential consequences—in a city witnessing a continuous rise of control mechanisms that are at once imposed on the urban landscape and normalized in practice, the interest of the map could not merely be to point out what is being secured, it has to also delineate the ways in which sites are being secured and reflect on the reasons that dictate such deployments. If not, the representation would be limited to a visualization of data that *à la limite* is more telling when lived than when read.

It is in this sense that the choice to represent the observations made (the data collected) in two distinct sets of codes becomes very important. In ➪ map A, the most detailed and comprehensive map presented in this document, the space discipline seen around the city is deciphered into (I) a qualitative reading of restrictions on access that begin to mark the city's security 'hot spots' and (II) a listing of elements—a sort of inventory—that documents the type of physical elements that make the disciplining both possible and sustainable.

While the two sets of information are inseparable in actuality, their clear distinction in the map allows for connections to be drawn and analytical readings to be made.

It is precisely these decisions that separate the map from the territory (the reality we sense) and it is also the same ones that enable the map to speak about the territory and deliver the reality we want to expose. While the guards, tanks, road blocks and all the other elements are usually justified—equally by most city users and by those who secure it—as necessary protective measures reacting to punctual political events, the map delivers another reading which brings latent demarcations to the surface and traces a number of dimensions besides the political, exposing a state-capital coalition that questions the 'official' nature of the secured city. The two other maps (➪ maps B, C) that qualify distinctions between site protection / riot control and public / private manifestations of security, emphasize these readings. The maps drop the detail in favor of more analytical observations—another proof of the power of what is absent from the map vis-à-vis the territory it represents.

But to be selective in a map is also a limitation. The most alarming observation made in the initial stages of the surveying and mapping work was the absence of the everyday user from the resulting representations. Unfortunately, the human element is not classically the stuff of maps. And experiences, rather than observations, often prove to be too individually specific, too varied for the generalizing methods maps depend on to be able to work.

This was a real concern. The general map carried an undeclared message, an assumption that users' experiences are uniform, and that their positionality does not play an active role in the negotiation of the security measures they are being subjected to. These types of assumptions are typical of mapmaking practices that evolved historically as intellectual apparatus of power, claiming and legitimizing realities with extremely serious consequences. J.B. Harley puts forward military maps as an example of sign systems that transformed along with the techniques of warfare from siege tactics to mobile strategies. They fostered an "empty" space, he explains, and acquired a "silent" appearance, one that facilitated conduct and palliated its moral dimension.

It became very clear at some point that an alternative approach to this common power-driven dehumanization of the territory is crucial to paint a valuable picture of the current militarization of urban space in Beirut and communicate the real concerns that evoked this investigation in the first place. Mapping out peoples' trajectories (➪ maps J) became a device through which representations can begin to tell stories and provide a reading of securing networks that emerge not only as a result of the physical deployments and security programs presented in earlier maps, but also the 'threat status' of each individual user.

Another limitation of the map, especially the geographic one, results from its deep-rooted concern with an 'ethics of accuracy'. This can be discussed as the result of a myth of scientism, a preoccupation with objectiveness and impartiality that enables the social dimension to be denied and pass unnoticed. Accuracy is never the issue, only the cover. As he deconstructs the agendas embedded in mapmaking practices, Denis Wood insists: "It is not precision that is at stake, but precision with respect to what"?

It was a great opportunity to encounter projects reflecting on the theme of security in Beirut in parallel to this investigation but with interestingly different outcomes. Some of the samples of George Sidaoui's project (➪ fig. G1–6) are based on data collected purely through experience (walking, driving, using the phone…), and others sacrifice the geographic backdrop to construct diagrams that can quantitatively assess levels of security as they respond to the nature of what is being secured and the threats that are being defined in the process.

And when this work draws connections from information with respect to a single point of view, and challenges the necessity of spatial detail, the work of Marwan Kaabour (➪ fig. K1–3) delivers diagrammatic representations that transcend this concern with accuracy altogether. They construct an imagined reality that seems to equally, if not more effectively, trace the intricate processes of security and control as they appropriate the many 'lived' aspects of the urban space and depend on the support of the communities inhabiting it.

Perhaps the most refreshing of contributions in this document are the ones that are less concerned with the informative and more focused on the speculative, or even the introspective as in the case of the visual dialogue between Mazen Kerbaj and Jana Traboulsi closing our paper (back cover).

Cosgrove (1999, 1–2) explains that how "to map is in one way or another to take the measure of a world, and more than merely take it, to figure the measure so taken in such a way that it may be communicated between people, places or times". And just as the mapping measure can equally be mathematical and political, its record can also belong to the archival as much as the remembered, imagined or contemplated—and the world it figures 'performed' in various ways. ❑

References

↔ Harley, J.B. (1997) 'Maps, Knowledge, and Power', in Cosgrove, Denis and Daniels, Stephen (eds) *The Iconography of Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design and use of past environments.* Melbourne; New York: Cambridge University Press.

↔ Wood, Denis (1992) *The Power of Maps.* London; New York: The Guilford Press.

↔ Cosgrove, Denis (1999) 'Introduction: Mapping Meaning', in Cosgrove, Denis (ed) *Mappings.* London: Reaktion Books.

Flyover cutting through residential areas, Nab'ah / Bourj Hammoud.

map A—VISIBLE SECURITY MECHANISMS IN MUNICIPAL BEIRUT



04—INTRICACIES OF THE SECURITY SYSTEMS

(Survey conducted between February and July 2009)



➪ **Map A** highlights the blatantly detectable aspects of the security deployment within Municipal Beirut. It identifies streets and security measures in visible operation, points out the different physical elements in use and locates the many forms of access restrictions, such as 'no parking' measures or permanent checkpoints that continuously redefine public spaces in the city. The widespread webs of security emerge as intricate programs that are orchestrated between military, police and private security forces, and that heavily depend on a multitude of physical elements, most of which are extremely invasive, including tanks, concrete blocks, sand bags and barbed wire. Furthermore, the different security hubs appear to be of two types: I) elaborate systems that spread across well-defined neighborhoods, usually for securing a number of closely located sites, and II) deployments of a lesser intensity. The latter are either in isolated high-end commercial or residential locations where private security is in operation, or in strategic points of intersection around the city where the army is mostly to be seen. The coding in this map qualifies security measures and breaks them down into physical elements and material effects on space, allowing for connections between the type of security and the intensity of deployment to be made. This map is the exhaustive visual record upon which further analysis is carried out. ❑

05—RE-CODING SECURITY SYSTEMS IN THE MUNICIPAL CITY

The Public / Private Divide in Security Mechanisms

The two maps propose a simplified re-coding of the material presented in ➪ **map A** that highlights specific aspects of the security deployment within Municipal Beirut. ➪ **Map C** stresses the existence of two types of security systems, one public and the other private. The public system includes all those actors who report to national state agencies and encompasses various police forces as well as the Lebanese Army that is particularly—but not exclusively—active with riot control. Private systems include an array of private security companies hired by politicians as well as private businesses (malls, individual stores, banks, etc.) and luxurious residential facilities. They also include private armed guards hired directly by politicians to insure their own safety.

➪ **Map B** indicates a clear separation of these systems, with the concentration of public security systems along riot lines and around particular areas housing politicians. It also shows that the systems strongly intersect in two locations, closely associated with the current government's political headquarters: Beirut Downtown and Qoraytem. (➪ **maps E, F** for a thicker description of this intersection). The map however conceals the fact that boundaries between the public/private are always less clear than they seem. It is, for example, customary for political figures to select the members of their (public) security personnel among their declared supporters within the ranks of the police and army forces.

map B—CRIME & RIOT CONTROL

Crime and Riot Control

➪ Map B undertakes a similar simplification of the coding to highlight the location of two different types of *security threats*: individual crime (whether in the form of an attack against a politician or through petty crime, theft, etc.) vs. communal tensions (riot control). The map is interesting to read against the historic green line of the city, the demarcation line that divided Beirut during the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) into its Christian and Muslim belligerent quarters. It indeed shows that the old demarcation lines continue to play the role of "hot points" in some sections of the city while additional divisions, notably those separating various (Muslim) Shiite and (Muslim) Sunni working class neighborhoods, have emerged. Our limited survey doesn't however allow us to account for the temporalities of such a map which changes considerably during "crisis time", such as during elections, political appointments and / or other incidents, when additional tanks and military deployment extend the impact of riot control to a new scale. ❑

map C—THE PUBLIC / PRIVATE DIVIDE IN SECURITY MECHANISMS

Jal el-Bahr, Beirut / Internal street

06—LIVING THE SECURE CITY

BY MONA FAWAZ

Student Research

In Fall 2007 / 08, I assigned to a class of 29 undergraduate architecture students enrolled in A331 *Introduction to Urban Theory* at the American University of Beirut the task of researching security mechanisms in the city. I asked them to document security instances, looking at the multiplicity of ways in which these mechanisms operated and how they had influenced their experiences and practices, be it in terms of restrictions and / or negotiations. I wanted to encourage them to think critically about the ways in which surveillance mechanisms were altering their experiences of the city. Since one's perception of security mechanisms is strongly influenced by one's political position, whether she / he associates with the political figure being protected and/or feels threatened by an "other" behind the riot security line, it was important for the students to conduct this research reflexively. I hence required each student to map the neighborhood and/or block in which she / he dwelled, thinking that in Beirut's geography of religious and income segregation, it was important for each student to critique the deployed security mechanism from within one's own religious and / or income group—avoiding hence the easy superficial denouncement of an "other". This requirement had the added advantage of building on their familiarity with the security codes in their respective neighborhoods, a familiarity they needed in order to navigate safely the suspicious eyes of security apparatuses. Three foreign students were exempted from this requirement, since they lived on campus and / or near AUB mapped instead other areas outside the class coverage.

The students' findings went well beyond my expectations. I discovered that only one out of 26 Lebanese students couldn't list a relatively severe security deployment around her / his residential area. The fact that these students came from a wide variety of religious and income groups and from different sections of the city indicated that the security deployment was indeed extensive and warranted more research. Excerpts shown on these two pages come from 2000–3000 words assignments and photographic essays and hardly give credit to the richness of the students' mapping. The surveys of Qoraytem, Rabieh and Beirut Downtown as well as the analysis of the security mechanisms in Beirut's southern suburbs (al-Dahiya) are also taken from this work. ❑

"One of the main victims of the security system are students coming to the Grand Lycee. The school is surrounded by the central police station of the area—turned into a real fortress in the city—and the private security of the French embassy. As a result, the students' buses and cars are searched in the morning, causing huge traffic jams and spill-overs. Needless to say, students feel very uncomfortable with this."
SARAH-RITA

"There are many inconveniences attached to living in the same building with NK [a former Minister]. If [NK] or his son is planning to leave the building, the parking curtains (added for his security) are shut down and building accesses (in and out) are blocked. If I am in my car at the time he is leaving in the morning, I have to wait for him to arrive, watch him being accompanied to his car by three bodyguards, and stand still until he leaves and the curtains are opened again. The same applies when he or his son are expected to enter the building in the coming minutes. I am asked to wait for them to arrive before I am allowed entrance to my own building. The same happens to visitors who are actually prohibited from approaching the building.
Inside the building, [NK] has added steel doors that block the building public stairway leading to and from his second floor apartment. These doors are locked day and night. This means that all the building's dwellers living above the second floor cannot use the staircase anymore [there is no fire exit]. In case of emergency, if we cannot use the elevator, we are stuck behind his steel door. But the inconvenience is felt daily: when the electricity is cut, I cannot leave my apartment at all. Since I have no way of contacting the guards to tell them to open the door for me, I go back up home and wait for the electricity to come back."
DANA

"In January 2007, after sectarian clashes opposed Sunni (Muslim) and Shiite (Muslim) students in the Beirut Arab University, Tariq el-Jdideh was assaulted by motorcyclists carrying wood sticks and breaking everything on their way: car windows, shop windows, etc. [...] The neighborhood residents responded to the invasion by throwing everything they could find out of their balconies: tiles, flower pots, water pipe arguileh, etc. Young men also gathered and marched to stop the invasion. [...] In the few hours following this event, Tariq el-Jdideh turned into a highly militarized zone. [...] Army trucks brought dozens of soldiers, check points were established, tanks were strategically located at hot points, and roads were blocked. [...] This created an ambivalent feeling of security and estrangement among the neighborhood inhabitants who were neither prepared nor accustomed to such procedures. In the following days, the procedures varied in type and intensity: road blocks were replaced by metal barriers forcing cars to zigzag, some checkpoints were removed, etc."
FARAH FARES EL-ARAB

Ayn el-Mreisseh, sea-front boulevard and entrance to the Campus of the American University of Beirut

"The parking restrictions imposed to secure the house of the Minister [MP] cause a huge congestion for the Church. [...] On Sundays and on special occasions, the area gets overcrowded and the once joyful social gatherings have turned into a cacophony of honking, screaming, threatening, etc.
In the construction site nearby, scrutiny is unbearable: all trucks are checked, the times at which they are allowed to arrive and/or park are restricted, all workers are IDed and checked whenever they walk in/out of the site (only Lebanese workers are allowed), etc. Surveillance cameras are directed towards the construction site. One of the residents living there stated that, '[MP]'s men won't relax until the contractor becomes one of them... They want to take over everything.'
Dwellers in the apartments directly facing the Minister's building have complained that they never open the windows and the curtains facing his residence due to the army of cameras that are directed towards them 24/7. They feel that this 'other who is watching them is actually staying with them in the house.' Someone stated, 'It's our own flat, yet we feel we've become strangers in it because of all these cameras watching us all the time.' Bedrooms to that side have been moved to the other even if sometimes the layout of the house doesn't work."
RUDINA ANTOON

"I have to go through the [Ayn el-Tineh] checkpoint whenever I go to AUB. Whenever I pass through this checkpoint, I slow down and lower the music volume. I also always notice the large poster of N.B. in the center of the roundabout."
ABDEL HALIM

"The Saha was the one and only 'public space' in Tariq el-Jdideh; the main gathering space for the young men of the area. On many occasions, such as after a football game, celebrations used to take place in the saha. Today any kind of gathering is forbidden. Even religious occasions such as a mawlid are held quietly."
BASMA IBRAHIM

"Many bridges surround my home and to avoid the traffic that they create, the politicians tend to take the route in front of my house as a shortcut to their destination since it links to inner roads and out of traffic. But to take this road all of them have to go in the opposite direction of the highway. What the army tends to do is to close the highway segment that leads to the Dbayeh Bridge by stationing a military tank at that location and hence secure an exclusive passage for VIPs. All the politician cars are armored and have jammers on them, so when the convoy passes under my house, all the phones are jammed and the television screen is scrambled."
CHADI DAGHER

"The [former Minister's] security personnel harasses everybody. The area where he moved used to act as a hang-out for foreign migrant workers looking for daily work. [...] Now all these workers have fled the area since the Minister's security personnel treated them in inhumane ways. In fact, most workers refuse to come to Roumieh today because they fear the potential harassment, even if they are coming with a one of the Lebanese dwellers in the area to work for him. But it's not only the workers, everyone is stopped. I get very often stopped and asked for an ID, and I have lived here long before the Minister became a Minister... in fact, I have lived here even before he moved to Roumieh."
MICHEL AZAR

07—SECURITY AT THE NEIGHBORHOOD LEVEL

Case Studies

The neighborhood case studies present accounts of the proliferation of security mechanisms in Greater Beirut. Each of the cases highlights the ways in which daily practices and commercial activities have been profoundly altered by the security apparel. These case studies address a variety of situations, depending on the location and / or position of the neighborhood within the Greater City map.

The analysis shows that the position of the neighborhood in the city prior to the deployment of the security apparatus affects considerably how this apparatus is deployed and how it affects users. Rabieh, for example, which was traditionally an upper-income residential area accustomed to a high level of private and municipal security to protect wealth is faced with a new form of security in which the upper income families are identified themselves as threats… to the politicians who moved in their exclusive neighborhood. Over time, private security protecting wealth has dwindled as cordoned-off areas and political guards took over the neighborhood. A new zoning is eventually imposed on the area, with its own security logic. A similar pattern of criminalizing dwellers is prevalent in the Qoraytem area and is documented through security elements and user practices. As for Beirut Downtown, its status as a high-end political center since 1990 has necessitated the prevalence of a wide private and public security deployment. This deployment however took new forms with the sit-in staged by the political opposition to the Government between 2006 and 2008. This section is complemented by two longer student essays that describe neighborhood security processes that rely on dweller involvements. Two different configurations, one centralized under the authority of a political party (al-Dahiya) and the other not (Tariq el-Jdideh) are presented in ways that reflect the position of the two students in their own neighborhoods. Finally, George Sidaoui's graphic design thesis documents the deployment of security mechanisms in the area of Hamra and its vicinities. ❑

Mapping for Rabieh, Downtown, Qoraytem and Haret Hreik is based on student work presented in 2007 / 2008 and 2009 in A331, Introduction to Urban Theory, at the American University of Beirut. **George Sidaoui** *and* **Marwan Kaabour** *are presenting sections of their Final Year Graphic Design thesis. When not listed, names were withheld on the students' request in order to protect their individual safety.*

07a—CRIMINALIZING THE RICH ON THEIR OWN TURF

Rabieh is a high-end exclusive suburban neighborhood situated in the North-East of Greater Beirut. The neighborhood was historically developed along the lines of a typical American suburban housing model, designed as a safe haven for middle and upper income Lebanese families. During the Lebanese civil war, the neighborhood also became a retreat for prominent Lebanese figures and the location of many embassies. As such, it relied on private security mechanisms associated especially with protection against theft.

Since 2005, Rabieh has been divided into several zones where several systems of protection (municipal, military and private) cater to the needs of the political figures who have established residence in this area. These include intensive municipal patrols, car identification slips and parking permits for residents and visitors, closed off areas, etc. These security mechanisms have profoundly affected local practices: The neighborhood playground is now squatted by army tents and walking paths and vehicular networks have been adapted and modified, sometimes closed off. Ironically, private security has dwindled with these measures as many residents have decided not to renew the contracts they maintained until then with private security firms. The now empty booths that used to house trained private security guards are indicative of this change. ❑

The table and images in this case study build on the student work of **Yasmeen Abboud, Joanne Choueiri, Lea Nassif-Ksayer** *and* **Stephanie Feghali** *in A331, An Introduction to Urban Theory (Fall 2007–08).*

SECURITY MEASURES POST 2005

	ZONE A—PROMINENT POLITICAL FIGURES (PF)			ZONE B, C—POLITICAL FIGURES / AMBASSADORS (A)	
LOCATION	AROUND PF PROPERTY	CLOSED OFF AREA	STREET	AROUND PF/A PROPERTY	STREET
MEASURES	CAMERA; POLICE GUARD; PERSONAL GUARD	2 ARMY GUARDS AT EVERY GATE CHECKING CARS AND QUESTIONING VISITORS; JAMMING MOBILE PHONE NETWORK	ARMY CHECKPOINT	ARMY CHECKPOINT	INCREASE IN MUNICIPAL PATROL; DISTRIBUTION OF RESIDENT CARDS AND 5 VISITORS CARDS TO EACH RESIDENT HOUSEHOLD
AGAINST	CAR EXPLOSION AND CRIMINAL ATTACKS			CAR EXPLOSION AND CRIMINAL ATTACKS	

SECURITY MEASURES PRIOR TO 2005

	ZONE A, B, C: A, B—INDIVIDUAL VILLAS / HOUSES; C—SINGLE APT. IN 5 STOREY BLDGS.			
LOCATION	WITHIN PROPERTY	AROUND PROPERTY	STREET	AREA
MEASURES	CAMERA LINKED TO HOME TELEVISION	PRIVATE SECURITY BOOTH; HIGH-FENCES; DOGS; MECHANICALLY	MUNICIPAL PATROL	LANDSCAPING
AGAINST	WORKER (GARDENER, DRIVER, HOUSEKEEPER…)	TRESPASSER / BURGLAR	UNSOLICITED PERSON (VENDOR, BEGGAR, SCAVENGERS…)	THE GAZE

fig D—RABIEH

07b—"THERE'S SOMETHING STALKING ME"

BY NAY AL-RAHI

It's a deadly feeling that seeps like thick fingers wrapping around the neck. A feeling similar to choking. Resulting from numerous factors. Let's start from Rabieh (…) [where there is] a scary increase in construction sites (…).

You wake up in the morning to the sound of steel pounding into the ground. The noise stops and turns into different sounds from the second construction site, where a heavy machine gobbles up the greenery next to your home... (…)

You come back in the early evening. You think that you're outsmarting the construction sites, you run to bed, you want to rest from the loudness of Beirut and its own construction sites (…). But you discover that the third construction site has not ended its day yet. The workers are still pounding the steel into the ground. Fixing the foundations of the thing that will block the sea view from your balcony. (…)

In Rabieh too, another siege is in operation—though this choking is not restricted to Rabieh but extends beyond it, precedes it and follows it, to the point of becoming one of the country's main characteristics.

It is the cameras and the security checkpoints in all places, visible and concealed ones, in all streets and suburbs. What is this astonishing phenomenon? A phenomenon that is no more restricted to the security islands surrounding the homes of politicians, each one of them, but that extends over to the city center, to the vicinities of banks, large institutions, universities, and schools sometimes… it has reached a point where we are unable to walk on the street without being watched. Something like a nationwide 'Star Academy' (…)

And if cameras do not take up the job of watching you arrogantly… the security man will, public or private, it doesn't matter. Previously, I could look into their eyes, while I am walking on some street. But today, I don't dare. I am in a constant state of fear over my ideas and my imagination from their creepy looks. I used to walk in the street and be proud that it's mine and for all its passers-by. I see today the streets being robbed from its pedestrians. Security besieges them. Cameras stalk them. Stalk them, and stalk me, as if I am a video-clip hero, playing the role of the terrified who is forbidden to stroll or to watch some place or someone for a while.

I want to stand for an hour in a section of the street, waiting for somebody, without feeling that the guy wearing blue or green is chasing me with his looks. And without him coming to ask me to confess the identity of who is it I am waiting for, armed with the power of his authority. And the country's security.

"Okay then, let's escape to the beach", someone might say. But there, too, I feel besieged. Don't you feel besieged by these luxurious tourist resorts dispersed all along the Lebanese coast (…)? These that promise you a different beach experience, in a luxurious classy flavor, only a few can afford? They promise you an experience you never lived, of course, on the public beaches, and you will never live.

You can only live this experience in those places decorated with blinding colors and lights, where you meet the people's elite, its exclusive customers. These people who can spend two-thirds of the income of a Lebanese family to enjoy the sun in one of these resorts (…) from which ordinary people only get a blocked horizon. ❑

Published on July 8, 2009 in Arabic in As-Safir, daily Lebanese newspaper, reprinted by permission of the author, translation by Mona Harb.

map E—QORAYTEM

Car circulation allowed
Car circulation restricted
Parking prohibited

07c—FROM RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOOD TO POLITICAL HEADQUARTERS

The security area was first established in Qoraytem when its most prominent resident, Rafiq Hariri, was appointed Prime Minister in 1992. After Hariri's assassination in 2005, the Security Area was considerably tightened, blocking traffic away from the Prime Minister's residence. At that time, questionnaires were distributed to all residents of Qoraytem, requiring them to declare details about the composition of the household (age, numbers, etc.), car ownership, as well as political affiliation, possession of weapons, and whether they overlooked the Hariri Palace from their houses.

[Securing Mechanisms / Elements]
At the **vehicular checkpoint**, a guard checks for explosives underneath cars with a mirror while another looks in the trunk. When large vehicles such as gas pick-up trucks need to go through the area, trained dogs are brought in and they inspect the scene before access is granted.

Steel barriers were the first security elements to be placed in the area: they blocked passage and marked the checkpoints. **Parking permits** were distributed for dwellers, tagging every car that was allowed to enter the secure area. These permits, however, do not secure permanent street parking. When important visitors are expected in the area, **police patrols** start circling the neighborhood and its surroundings, calling for all residents to remove cars immediately or get towed away. This has caused several incidents since some exacerbated residents react sometimes violently—especially if it is at three in the morning!

Visitors need special permissions and could be allowed in if they can demonstrate that they are visiting specific individuals in the area. This, of course, is negotiable and many people use the name of a friend and / or family member in order to gain passage to the area.

Security cameras were eventually introduced to the area. They took longer to be installed, since wiring and other technical issues is time consuming. At first, these cameras demarcated the boundaries of the security area. Later, cameras were also installed outside the security area, tracking movements in nearby zones.

A recent addition to the security deployment in Qoraytem are **concrete cylinders** (CC). CCs were installed following the May 7th 2008 events in Beirut, when Hezbollah took the streets and forced out private security actors aligned / funded with the Hariri political movement. CCs can be described as an advanced defensive system against any future "military" events. The CCs are **2.5 m high hollow concrete cylinders** that have an approximate 1.2m diameter and a thickness of 30cm. They have openings at eye level, directed in particular directions: in the context of each single cylinder, the openings are located to face the streets ends, or "strategic corners". They also include small holes from which the guard can shoot the approaching enemies.

Additional barriers were recently installed in front of the Saudi Embassy, **blocking** one of the two main directions through which **traffic flows** around Qoraytem. Instead, the heavy two lane circulation is now forced to merge in one point in front of the Saudi Embassy, exacerbating an already horrible congestion—especially when the nearby school is in session.

[Public / Private]
Public and private security
One can easily guess that both public and private security guards are present in the area, though the ratio of one to the other is not obvious. *Secure Plus* is a private company that provides guards to work in this area and other locations in Lebanon. It is unclear, however, if Secure Plus is the exclusive private company in this area.

Collaboration between the **Saudi Embassy's** security and the Hariri security can best be noticed when the Saudi ambassador prays on Fridays in the **Qoraytem mosque**. In those times, car access to the secure area is strictly restricted to local residents and visitors are not tolerated. Embassy cars and guards line up on the street in front of the mosque. When the ambassador enters the mosque, several embassy guards enter with him and take their positions, ready to protect him from any threat even inside the mosque.

[Experiencing the security area]
People living in the area express different feelings vis-à-vis the security mechanisms. Some feel shocked, harassed, and / or profoundly disturbed by the security deployments. Others feel safe by the provided security and some have even developed a good relationship with the guards. To the latter group, car permits and vehicular checkpoints offer good protection against potential bombs or petty crimes and limited vehicular circulation provides safe streets and open spaces for children to play.

Bike and walk routes
Because the bike is perceived suspiciously by many security guards, biking through the security area is not always an easy task. When I ride my bike to AUB, I am forced to go around the security area: I head to Pain D'Or through Snoubra, reach Leon Street and then take a direct path to AUB crossing the main Hamra Street.

Commercial practices
Commercial activities have suffered enormously from the establishment of the security zone. Since 2005, **many shops have closed** because clients are reluctant to expose themselves to security checks. ❑

The map and text are based on anonymous student work in A331, An Introduction to Urban Theory (Fall 2007 / 08 and Spring 2009).

map F—BEIRUT CENTRAL DISTRICT





Concrete barriers in front of the United Nations Building

07d—POLITICAL STAND-OFF

The Beirut Central District is a business and entertainment area that was developed in the post-Lebanese civil war era as a main landmark of the city's reconstruction. The area also houses a hub of public institutions, most notably the Serail—the Prime Minister seat—and the national parliament. It also includes the regional United-Nations headquarters, the seat of the highest public planning authority in the country (CDR), bank headquarters and several embassies (British, Australian, Japanese). The BCD is also the burial grounds of Rafic Hariri's, in a site close to Martyr's square regularly visited by locals and foreigners, that is heavily protected.

In December 2006, the parties in opposition to the national government called for a sit-in in order to protest state policies and force the government's resignation. They eventually established tents in Riad El Solh and Azarieh squares and camped in these public spaces for 18 months. During those months, security measures were severely heightened, restricting vehicular access to many streets in/around the camp. Although the camp was dismantled in May 2008, the security apparatus remains strongly in place around the main hub of public institutions which has turned into a fortified enclave of some 50 m radius, surrounded by 3 m high walls and barbed wire. The main pedestrian access point to the fortified district is located next to the Murr Tower. To access one of the embassies, visitors have to park around Fakhreddine Street and walk for several minutes after receiving clearance at the checkpoint. Private shuttles were also provided for those trying to reach commercial and recreational facilities within this area by Solidere, the company developing the Business District. ❑

The map and tables in this section document the zone at the time of the sit-in. Based on the student work of **Farah Budeiri** *and* **Ryam Idriss** *in A331, Introduction to Urban Theory (Fall 2007/08).*

SECURITY GUARDS

	ARMY	'FAWJ EL MUGHAWEER'	POLICE	SERAIL POLICE	PRIVATE SECURITY GUARDS	HEZBOLLAH GUARDS
INTENSITY	AROUND 300	UNKNOWN	AROUND 300	UNKNOWN	AROUND 300	UNKNOWN
FUNCTION	MAIN MILITARY AUTHORITY / PREVENTS ATTACKS	PROTECTS THE SERAIL FROM ATTACKS AND PERCIEVES THREATS	OBSERVES AND COLLECTS INFORMATION DEEMED NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE AREA	COORDINATES WITH THE SERAIL ARMY TO ENSURE ORDER WITHIN THE SERAIL	PROTECTS INFRASTRUCTURE, PUBLIC PROPERTY / ENSURES CLEANINESS / OBSERVES THE AREA	MONITORS THE AREAS SURROUNDING THE CAMPING SITE / QUESTIONS INTRUDERS
EMPLOYER	GOVERNMENT	GOVERNMENT	GOVERNMENT	GOVERNMENT / SERAIL	SOLIDERE / OWNERS OF PRIVATE BUILDINGS	THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE PARTY
POSSESSION OF WEAPONS	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	UNKNOWN

Barbed wire, Beirut Central District

07e—AL-DAHIYA AND THE HEZBOLLAH SECURITY APPARATUS

STUDENT WORK (ANONYMOUS)—A331 URBANISM, 2007/08

Al-Dahiya is a term that triggers a reaction in every Lebanese, which widely varies from non-negotiable paranoia to extreme pride, depending on one's religious belonging, political orientations and experiences in/around Beirut. Al-Dahiya refers to the socially constructed territory of the southern suburb of Beirut, one that merges its neighborhoods into a single label affiliated to a religious and political identity: specifically, al-Dahiya refers to the Shi'a area that houses Hezbollah's headquarters since the 1980s. This essay builds on my experience as a long-term dweller of al-Dahiya as well as on selected meetings with Hezbollah's officials. It analyzes how Hezbollah's security apparatus is deployed in space, and how people interact with its mechanisms through its various codes.

Since, the deployment of their security apparatus in Haret Hreik, Hezbollah also developed social services to improve the living conditions of the dwellers. Some sort of exchange was established between Hezbollah and the community which progressively developed into a strong political support that widened the acceptable margin of the party's control over the place, forming the basis of a territorialized body politic that gave the neighborhood a powerful political identity.

The security apparatus of Hezbollah, although extremely present, is almost undetectable. There are no physical manifestations of it: no roads closed, no guards in front of houses, no fixed checkpoints, no restricted parking, no parking permits, no hidden cameras, etc. Homes of parliament members, ministers of Hezbollah, and even leaders, are not protected or sealed off by barricades, bumps, zigzags, or show-off security. What we see is an ordinary life based on the concepts of stealth and keeping a low profile.

Hence as an ordinary dweller of al-Dahiya, I can access all streets with no interruptions. I see Indibat men [Hezbollah's police] with their outfits organize traffic on street corners and municipality officers on other corners along with policemen. I might see cars with tinted glass silently passing by, but I cannot identify who is inside. I do feel secure, especially if I am pro-Hezbollah. If I am not, I still am able to behave as I would like, no one will interrupt my way; maybe some people might perceive some acts as violations to privacy but this is exceptional. I know from previous experiences and personal assessments through daily practice what is acceptable and what is not for Hezbollah's security. I am able to identify when I am getting into trouble.

In Hezbollah's world, there is no specific law hung on the wall, but there is some sort of code that has been constructed through everyday practice and daily decisions that security officials made and that dwellers in the area know well. This code is updated regularly based on changing practices, so if someone left the place and came back few years later, s/he would have missed a lot. One learns/understands the code by testing it through practices. Knowledge of the code depends on lived experiences, on how long people have dwelled in al-Dahiya and how close they are to Hezbollah. The code contains restrictions, such as: I) not taking pictures whatsoever, except for private photography; II) no youth gathering that can cause harassment; III) no "immoral behavior" according to Hezbollah's religious code of conduct, i.e. no alcohol and no intimate behavior in public space, and no loud parties; IV) no walking around with a map in hand.

These restrictions are enforced through a well-defined, multi-layered, networked and highly hierarchical mechanism controlled by Hezbollah that cannot be fully detailed here due to the sensitivity of the information. Suffice to say that it includes an indirect level of control operated by ordinary dwellers who feel a sense of responsibility towards enforcing these restrictions, in addition to a direct level of control operated by different levels of the party's security apparatus. This mechanism contributes to the creation of a sense that "Hezbollah is always there even if you don't see it", which has a deterring aspect that plays a significant role in making people feel protected. The invisibility of this protection is also positive for non-supporters of the party who do not feel its harassment or violence. In a sense, this security apparatus performs better than the public security system as it has no rivalry within it and operates much more efficiently. In addition, this apparatus relies widely on trust and secrecy amongst its members, who are selected based on their strong religious background, and between members and dwellers ❑

Military barracks in Tariq al-Jdideh

07f—TARIQ EL-JDIDEH AS POLITICAL TERRITORY

BY MARWAN KAABOUR—GRAPHIC DESIGN FINAL YEAR THESIS, 2009

Beirut can be seen as divided into sectarian enclaves characterized by a mutually exclusive sense of loyalty and allegiance to a political authority. In times of political stability, enclaves have blurred boundaries. In times of conflict, people, fuelled by an intensified sense of togetherness, can retreat into an *esprit de corps*, i.e. a 'common spirit of comradeship, enthusiasm, and devotion to a cause among the members of a group'. This coalescence reinforces the enclave where people claim the space as their territory and demarcate it in various ways.

My work deals with Tarik el-Jdideh, a rather conservative Sunni neighborhood of Beirut, allied with Hariri and its Mustaqbal movement, investigating how it operates as a territorial enclave. I encountered several obstacles while doing my fieldwork. As a young man walking in Tarik el-Jdideh with a notebook and a camera, I was a cause of intrigue and annoyance. I had to stop repeatedly and explain to people what I am doing and why. I systematically needed to mention my name, who my father is, the fact that I am originally from the area and used to live there, as well as show my identity card. For photos, I had to be coached by Mustaqbal's coordinator who said: "It is preferable that we send a couple of men [guards] from the party to escort you (…). However, there are areas which are considered more sensitive than others and where you cannot go". Afterwards I was asked to meet with a neighborhood leader, who is not a Mustaqbal "employee" but works under its authority, who inquired about my research and asked me to come back tomorrow. The next day, I was escorted by one of the young men, who usually gather on street corners, on his motorcycle around Tarik el-Jdideh. He was very helpful and seemed to have authority as residents did not ask why I was taking photos while I was him.

After the assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in February 2005, the Sunni community felt threatened and a heightened sense of sectarian belonging flared among the city's residents. This was mirrored in Tarik el-Jdideh. The process of territoriality progressively materialized by demarcating further its boundaries against the 'other/they' (the Shi'i 'enemy') and delineating further sectarian identities inside the neighborhood, i.e. inside what constitutes the 'we'. Several mechanisms contributed to this territorialization process. One of these mechanisms is the use of visual language elements in public space: the display of flags, posters and banners, the positioning of military tanks at border lines, the marking of main spaces and the periodic convoys of motorcycles carrying flags and shouting slogans… In this latter case, flags and posters become in a state of motion, as they move with the convoy. In specific political moments, the need to display temporarily power throughout the neighborhood and across its boundaries becomes a dire necessity. The use of the motorcycle and the human body allows to demarcate larger surface areas and to claim power over 'other' spaces in the city.

When the government banned the public display of posters in the city's streets, the use of visual elements in Tariq el-Jdideh was put to a halt. However, it was merely a symbolic removal of the physical manifestation of territoriality which remained strongly rooted in its residents and their spaces. On the last week of December 2008, I was in Tariq el-Jdideh at a relative's house. Saad Hariri was passing by the area. We heard some commotion, and out of the blue, the entire street came to life and, in one voice, everyone chanted, from their balconies, from the street, from the rooftops: "Allah, Hariri, Tariq el-Jdideh!"—confirming that the disappearance of posters and banners in the neighborhood's streets did not affect its *esprit de corps* and its ability to express itself.

Visual language within the urban space of a political enclave participates to the reproduction of its power. Visual changes in the urban space give new meanings to the built environment and hence, reproduce urban space. Visual language becomes a dialogue between the "we", and the "they", all in the context of the city. Tarik El-Jdideh transforms into a place where boundaries hold something of additional value. By distancing themselves from their opponents, by materializing their *esprit de corps* through a set of visual elements in their public spaces, residents empower themselves and close up the boundaries of their territory, rendering it pure and unscathed by the 'enemy'. Thus, Tariq el-Jdideh is no longer part of the larger city, it becomes the city by itself where the spatial translation of belonging results in a feeling of felicity: the sheer joy of knowing who you are, bluntly. Furthermore, the classic notions of visual language, i.e. the poster, banner, and flag are renegotiated. The way the residents and supporters re-appropriate these elements of demarcation by adding sound, mobility and spatiality change their form and function. The way these elements expand beyond their medium and their flat surface transforms the urban space which is the product of the various interactions between people, territory and symbol, all of which contribute to construct the space's identity. ❑

07g—IN & AROUND HAMRA

Living / Experiencing Security Systems

BY GEORGE SIDAOUI
—GRAPHIC DESIGN FINAL YEAR THESIS, 2009

The mapping work of George Sidaoui targets a well-defined network of streets in Beirut and, using different types of diagrams, meticulously records the mechanisms deployed for their security. The base map on which the different secured locations are plotted shows a wide variety and a high density of secured places (governmental institutions, army bases, embassies, hospitals, schools, banks and government officials' residences among others)—a common phenomenon in several other security hubs around the city. One type of diagram records the effects of these mechanisms on navigation: every street is represented separately and comparisons can be made between the driver and the pedestrian experience at different times of the day. The obstructive impact of the security measures is clear in the example of Clemenceau Street shown here, where the physical objects have a notable material effect on everyday circulation, imposing deviations on the route and changing the street configuration significantly. The diagram also shows how certain obstacles are temporal, appearing only at night for example, which reveals the dynamic nature of the security processes. A less visible security measure, airspace security, is mapped out in another diagram where variations in the blocking of frequency signals are deciphered and their intensities are measured at the different locations. The hierarchy between the different secured locations is the subject of the third diagram shown here; it measures the intensity of the security programs as they respond to a series of threats such as a camera, a bag, different vehicles and of course, the mobile phone, the threat of which is an indicator of an increased level of security found at locations where the measures are especially intense. ❑

Illustrations by **George Sidaoui**

Hamra Street: Banner reads 'Lebanon First', one of the slogans that circulated in Beirut after the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005.

fig G2—NAVIGATION / CIRCULATION BY CAR AL

CLEMENCEAU STREET





map G1





ONG STREET



government official's residence / office
governmental institution
civil defense force base
army base
embassy/council

hospital
school
university
guest house
religious monument
commercial center
bank

perpendicular street/crossing
sidewalk
parking lane
car travel lane/navigational route
travel direction
security zone perimeter
security hub buffer zone
slow speed
moderate speed
high speed
walking path

100 cars/hour
1 minute
metal barrier/obstacle—on street
metal barrier/obstacle—on street
metal barrier/obstacle —on street/sidewalk
booth/obstacle —on street/sidewalk

SADAT/EL HUSSEIN/BADR DEMACHKIYE STREET

fig G3—AIRSPACE SECURITY ALONG STREET



throughout the day



fig G4—NAVIGATION / CIRCULATION ON FOOT A

CLEMENCEAU STREET









LONG STREET—AT SECURITY ZONE



government official's residence / office
governmental institution
civil defense force base
army base
embassy/council

H hospital
S school
U university
G guest house
R religious monument
C commercial center
B bank

perpendicular street/crossing
sidewalk
parking lane
car travel lane/navigational route
travel direction
security zone perimeter
security hub buffer zone
slow speed
moderate speed
high speed
walking path

100 cars/hour
1 minute
metal barrier/obstacle—on street
metal barrier/obstacle—on street
metal barrier/obstacle —on street/sidewalk
booth/obstacle —on street/sidewalk

incoming frequency signal in operation
incoming call in operation
outgoing call in operation
call in process in operation
incoming call blocked
outgoing call blocked
call in process blocked
proceedings in operation
proceedings blocked
airspace security / frequency signal breaker

fig G5—INTENSITY OF SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN AT THE DIFFERENT SECURITY HUBS



fig G6—INTENSITY OF OBJECTS OF THREAT FOR THE DIFFERENT SECURITY HUBS





government official's residence/office
governmental institution
civil defense force base
army base
embassy/council

cctv camera
walkie talkie
machine gun
tank
satellite radar

mirror
police car
road spikes
concrete block
metal barrier

guard wall
metal bar
barrel
barbed wire
metal barrier

tire
metal barrier
road bumps
booth
road bar

army personnel
civil defense force personnel
private defense force personnel
body guard

parked truck
parked bus
parked car
taxi pick-up
motorcycle

camera
bag
mobile phone

08—BEYOND NARROW SECURITY MATTERS

Income, Class, Religion, Gender and Other Individual Identifiers

These maps introduce to our analysis a wider definition of the notion of security, one that thickens the reading of riot control lines and the private security of politicians to include class, religious, national and other individual positions that considerably influence the way one reads and experiences these security mechanisms. Recognizing the difficulties of drawing boundaries and defining clear-cut areas, we have relied for this mapping on a number of indicators that can express the patterns we are looking to highlight, without, nonetheless, pretending that actual lines can be drawn for class and / or religious divisions.

➪ Map H provides a reading of income divisions in Beirut, presented by highlighting land prices, privatized public spaces, and the transportation infrastructure that serves the needs of the rich (highway networks, airport, and port). The map highlights in particular the highway connecting the Airport to Beirut's Central District, built in the late 1990s, to take directly the investor and/or the tourist from the airport to the city center, with minimal entrances and exits and a carefully planned tunnel design avoiding physically and visually the adjacent southern suburbs. The map also indicates areas in the city where land prices are highest—areas pointed out by high-end developers as prime investment zones—and areas where affordable housing is located (refugee camps and informal settlements). It also indicates the locations of exclusive shopping and entertainment facilities (e.g. beach resorts), especially those that have taken over the city's public spaces and privatized them to the benefit of a few endowed actors. The map finally points out the location of a number of public institutions and agencies (ministries and universities), pointing to the possibility of publicly accessible, inclusive spaces. ❑

The mapping for income divisions is based on previous research conducted by **Nadine Bekdache** *and* **Mona Fawaz.**

map H—INCOME DIVISIONS IN BEIRUT



Highway connecting the Beirut Central District to the Airport



map I—RELIGIOUS LANDMARKS IN BEIRUT

➪ Map I highlights religious landmarks in municipal Beirut, specifically mosques and churches, showing a wide area of homogenous religious groups and a relatively mixed zone around the American University of Beirut (popularly known as Ras Beirut). Although these landmarks are significant and indeed continue to point out actual patterns of dwelling in the city, they may be confusing given forced population displacements during the civil war (1975–1990). Hence, the density of churches in Ras Beirut should not be interpreted as an indication of a high presence of Christian families but rather as a testimony of a historic religious mixity that was severely compromised by the civil war. In order to stress the point and help the readers identify the religious strongholds of the city, the historic green line (the dividing line between Christian East Beirut and Muslim West Beirut) during the civil war was also drawn on the map. ❑

➪ Maps H and I *provide important background patterns for reading the individual trajectories laid out on the following pages.*



09a—Political Affiliation & The Experience of Security Systems



map J1

Tariq al Jdideh, the intersection of daily practices with military architecture



map J2

"There is no inconvenience with the security around Qoraytem [Security area around the residential compound of the Prime Minister, ⇨ 07c]. When we visit relatives who live in this area, we only go through the tent checkpoint and inform the security guard about our destination. Besides, everyone can park her/his car around and access the shops located in the security area.
The security around Ayn-el Tineh is different, it is provocative. I have trouble accessing the bank located within this zone. NB [the Head of the Parliament who lives in the area] has his pictures marking the limits of the area. […] When the municipality forced all politicians to remove their pictures, he had to comply. He has however left the big frames… just in case! We visit al Dahiya (Beirut's Shiite southern suburb, ⇨ 07e) only once a year, to conduct the official car inspection."

Omar and Aysha are a retired, Lebanese middle-income couple whose religious and political affiliations coincide with the Prime Minister's/March 14 Movement.

"I buy almost everything I need from Ashrafieh just because I am so used to the area and the behavior of people. We lived in Sioufi before the war and in 1978 went back to Bikfaya, where I am originally from. I came back to live in Beirut 10 years ago, but only recently did it occur to me that I live on the 'demarcation line'. After the May 7, 2008 events [during which Hezbollah and the Lebanese Political Opposition took over the streets and forced the government's resignation], my friends started asking me when I will move houses. I would reply naively: 'why would I move? I live next to the French embassy'.
The extensive security around my house doesn't bother me in principle: we finally have a state that is getting organized. Had it been a militia, it would have bothered me. Besides they are more informed than I am about the necessity of such measures. During exceptional events, if [French President] Sarkozy is visiting for example, the security becomes a hassle since the Internal Police Forces base is behind my house. This was also the case after the May 7 events when the police arrested many people. They asked residents not to park on the inner streets as to leave space for police cars that had to work extra shifts. They also banned cars from parking in the available open lots in the area for 2 days. […] Every now and then, we have to bear the sight of police cars and extra tanks for a couple of days.

09b—Living behind the Police Base

I went to Carmel Saint Joseph School, a Christian school [located in the Verdun area/Muslim West Beirut during the war] where students from different religions attended. There were no highways at the time. The trip used to take over an hour. People always asked my dad: 'Why do you send your children to this school and have them cross everyday in front of the Palestinians in Mazraa?' […] As children, we used to look out of the window searching the buildings in the area, to see what the Palestinian looked like."

Rawiyah is a Lebanese, middle-age, married woman. She claims no political affiliations but puts her faith in the State.

09—TRAJECTORIES AND CURRENT PRACTICES IN/OF THE CITY

Individualizing the experience of Security

Security mechanisms do not affect all city dwellers equally. Neither is threat perceived, assessed, and tolerated similarly. To the contrary, our conversations with members of different religious, income and national groups highlight the diversity of ways in which city dwellers define, interpret, and negotiate the threats they perceive in the city. Things also look differently to and are perceived variably by men and women. As a result, we developed more thorough and systematic interviews with members of different social groups, asking them to detail their daily practices in the city and reflect on what constituted, in their eyes, potential threats and safety zones.

The maps on the following pages lay out some of the most interesting trajectories we unraveled. Overlaid on the previous maps, especially those describing security instances (⇨ map A), class (⇨ map H) and religious (⇨ map I) divisions, these maps show the extent to which one's sense of safety depends on individual positionality. They also clearly indicate that one's tolerance of threat as a daily necessity varies from one individual to another, depending especially on one's income group and hence one's ability to balance safety needs with other needs, mainly earning a living. The comments that each of the respondents stated vis-à-vis security are also helpful in unraveling the possibilities that each has to respond/talk back to the security system or to avoid it. Since our own social positions and experiences have naturally influenced our selection/reading of security, we chose to include our trajectories as authors—hoping to provide readers with important clues about some of the biases that inevitably mark this work (⇨ maps J7–10). These maps should not however be taken as representative of particular groups, they are rather only indicative of the ways in which one's social

map J3



Informal settlement
Regularly visited area
Palestinian refugee camp
Travel between areas

Residence
Workplace
Visited landmark
Past residence
Past Workplace
Souq
Commercial street
Mall
Supermarket
Cooperation
Church community
chance encounter/ walking around
Café/Restaurant
House visit
Beach resort
Neighbour visit
Hubble Bubble
Dancing

by night
by day
with stroller
daily
on Sundays
movie theatre
S flat sharing
V volunteer work
F field work
M Megastore

Museum area, barbed wire

09c—Memory as Place Marker

"Whenever I pass by the Police Station in Verdun, I remember the time an officer slapped me after the police wrongfully associated me to a group of burglars. It hurts me and I really hate passing by this area so I try to avoid it.
I have a lot of work here and I am making good money since I decided to work for myself and not as a live-in, as I did for the first ten years in Beirut. I pay my sponsor all the expenses necessary for my papers to be legal in addition to a small fee and I earn my freedom and live the way I want. I am searching for a good person to act as a sponsor for my husband so he can move from Bangladesh and come to work here with me."

Roohie is a 33 year old Bangladeshi woman who works as a house helper. She is religiously observant and wears the veil.

New construction in Ayn el-Mreisseh







position in the local class, gendered, and national hierarchies influences one's understanding and experience of security.

Selecting and Profiling Respondents
We attempted to include in our trajectory samples several population groups, accounting for gender, national and racial belonging, political status (e.g. refugees), and income groups. Respondents were selected among our direct relations (e.g. helpers, nannies, workers, relatives, etc.), whom we asked to detail daily practices in the city and reflect on what constituted, in their eyes, potential threats and safety zones. In selecting respondents, we located actors who share our work spaces but occupy different positions in their social hierarchies. Our intention was to highlight how the different positions of these actors actually influence their experiences and representations of those same places and hence their assessment of safety / threat in each of these contexts.

In analyzing the trajectories of migrant workers and Palestinian refugees, it is important to account for the fact that these population groups are among the most disadvantaged groups in the city. Although they have been in Lebanon for several decades and have closely integrated the country's social and economic networks, a large number of the 350,000 officially registered Palestinian refugees (actual number exceed this one by several folds) continue to live in poverty whereby their income and literacy levels as well as their life expectancy are well below national averages. Palestinians also face harsh discrimination in Lebanon where, for example, employment in many professions is almost inaccessible and access to property ownership legally banned.

map J4



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

Flyover near residential areas, Nab'ah/Bourj Hammoud

"We are foreigners, we have to take care for ourselves. I feel comfortable in my house, at the church, and when we go on excursions around Lebanon with the church community. A friend of mine and I caught a kid who was calling us names, throwing stones and spitting at us, and went to his parents. It was a big fight. 'Diggy diggy 1 dollar' is a name I often hear. The police sometimes call us from far on the streets in this tone: 'You! Come here!'. Sometimes they also stop the bus as early as 6 am to check our papers, I always have mine on me. I don't like Sabra, it is very dirty, I go to Qarantina to buy my meat."

Comfort is a 32 year old, married Nigeria woman who works as a house helper

map J5



09e—Aligning with Local Politics

"When I go to Syria, I long for Beirut. I am very organized here: I cook and eat at the same time daily and I do my own laundry. I am here for my future and not my present. I don't have a work contract, but my employer treats me like his son and I get official holidays.
I like Barbour because no one meddles with you. In general, I don't go to areas in East Beirut and I prefer Shiite areas. I am a big supporter of the resistance and feel that the Sunnis are not good hearted.
The building in which I live is located opposite to my work and is mostly inhabited by Syrians, so I spend most of my free time there. My employer helped me get this residence after I complained that my salary was spent on transportation. When I hear how often my friends are stopped and interrogated, especially when passing near Hariri's house [Qoraytem area, seat of the Prime Minister, ➪ 7e], I hope it never happens to me. So far, it has not."

Mohammad is a 22 year old Syrian worker.







➪ As for migrant workers, they are generally divided in strict racial and income groups in Lebanon. Those coming from the nearby Middle-East or from other countries in the South are generally confined in a relatively strict racial hierarchy that defines the sectors of employment that they can access (e.g. Syrians in construction works, Sri-Lankan, Nigerian, and Filipino in cleaning jobs, etc.). These two groups also face severe legal discrimination, especially with employment laws that not only limits their work opportunities but also confines them in precarious and subdued positions vis-à-vis their employers. They also face the hostility of many members of the host nation and are regularly verbally and / or physically aggressed when they are identified through their accents, color, or other physical distinctive features.

Center / Periphery

A striking difference between the ➪ map J series on these pages is the difference in the anchorage of the trajectories that are concentrated within the city's municipal boundaries for the authors (➪ maps J7–10) and clearly outside it for migrant workers (➪ maps J3–6). This is perhaps one of the best illustrations of the ways in which one person's security is another's threat: although we deliberately selected actors who we knew came daily to the city for their work activities, we learned that their relation to work places were often punctual, connected to their areas of residence and / or spaces of comfort through public transportation networks in linear form. Both migrant workers and the Palestinian refugees felt threatened in most areas of the city: their accents, habits, and appearances were clearly more tolerated and / or integrated in the city's peripheries. Yet, migrant workers identified exceptional

map J6



09f—When Speaking Becomes Difficult: Avoiding the Other

"I never go to public places or sit in a restaurant alone. When I speak, I attract attention. If I go into shops in Verdun or Hamra, I am always asked where I am from and when I reply that I am from [the] Chatila [Palestinian Refugee Camp], people step back. In other markets, no one asks me this question. If I happen to be in East Beirut, like when my father entered Rizk Hospital, I don't even go into a grocery store. I fear for my son from the police, if anything happens to him, there is no one to claim him."

Nadia is a 39 year old Palestinian refugee who works as a nanny.
She is a mother of three.

Headquarters of the National Security Offices, seen from nearby residences

Informal settlement
Regularly visited area
Palestinian refugee camp
Travel between areas

Residence
Workplace
Visited landmark
Past residence
Past Workplace
Souq
Commercial street
Mall
Supermarket
Cooperation
Church community
chance encounter/ walking around
Café/Restaurant
House visit
Beach resort
Neighbour visit
Hubble Bubble
Dancing
Singing

by night
by day
with stroller
daily
on Sundays
movie theatre
S flat sharing
V volunteer work
F field work
M Megastore

areas in the city –notably its sea-front corniche (widely celebrated as the main public space in the city) where catching up with a friend for a walk, smoking an *arguileh* water pipe, or sipping a cup of coffee is possible for almost everyone. Another shared space in the city is the migrant workers' hubs in Hamra where a number of buildings and/or areas abandoned during the civil war have been turned into affordable spaces where specialized commercial activities and affordable shared housing arrangements are available to most. These two areas constitute spaces of exception within the municipal city. As attested by the maps, the main zones of comfort for non-Lebanese working class nationals are confined to the peripheries.

In contrast, our own trajectories (➪ maps J7–10) are clearly anchored within the city proper where our homes, workspaces, entertainment areas, and other daily practices occur. All of us maintain nonetheless relations to the peripheries, whether in the form of individual visits, research, or others. This is however where our own trajectories become more punctual and linear and the end point clearly targeted. At one level, these differences could be explained by class. The comparison with the two trajectories of modest Lebanese households (➪ maps J1–2) necessitates however additional explanations for the center/periphery divide. For example, the regular visits that conservative Sunni families regularly pay to the Hariri burial site in Beirut downtown (➪ map J1) and the multiplicity of social networks that connect them to other families within the city even if their own homes are not in the city core provides a sense of ownership and/or identification for these groups, which many others do not have.

➪



map J7

09g—Speaking Back I

"For the last few years, the neighborhood I live in has been sealed off for car access and constantly secured by security guards, as it houses the Speaker of Parliament's residence. The security mechanisms force residents and city dwellers to make big detours to reach their destinations in the city, causing huge traffic jams in my street which is open for vehicular access during the day, but only accessible to residents and their guests during night time. It annoys me that I have to constantly negotiate access to my house and to deal with the security guards, who are regularly changed and do not recognize residents or their cars. They ask me who I am, where do I live and sometimes deny that there's a building by this name in the street. I get angry and answer them they could do the basic homework of at least knowing the names of the people living in that darn street they're securing. One day, in broad daylight, while I was getting into my car, a security guard walked to me and asked where I was going. I told him he had no business asking me this personal question. We got into a row in which I said: 'You know, I was living here way before you!'. He answered me: 'No, "we" were here before "you"!', with sectarian undertones in which he assumed he's speaking to a Sunni (living in a predominantly Sunni neighborhood) who was addressing him as a Shi'a (being the security guard protecting the Shi'a Speaker of Parliament) who is a new comer to Beirut."

Mona Harb is author of this document.

The sea-front corniche:
A public space in Beirut



map J8

09h—Speaking back II

"I have lived in this neighborhood since I was born. I feel very safe in my area. Residents usually recognize each other easily and a level of interaction between them on the streets is visible. The car bombing that targeted Prime Minister Rafic Hariri took place on the street that leads directly to my house. Access through the bombing site stayed restricted for almost 3 years, and the street was only cleared about a year ago. Since the Phoenicia Hotel (also on the sea front next to my house) became a temporary residence for many politicians, tanks, army cars and wandering soldiers make regular appearances in my neighborhood. It often provokes me and I make it a point to ask the soldiers for the reasons they surround the residents by tanks. Sometimes when they refuse to answer claiming security reasons, I insist by saying I have the right to know precisely because they think there is a risk on my life."

Nadine Bekdache is author of this document.

map J10

➪ **Deployment, spread, etc.**
Deployment and / or spread of one's imprint in the city parallels the center / periphery division, betraying how one's sense of safety and / or comfort in the city influences one's footprint in the city. Again, the contrast between the spread of ➪ maps J3–6 where trajectories are confined to particular, well-targeted safety zones and ➪ maps J7–10 that move trespass across religious and center / periphery divides is telling. It indicates that one's sense of security, once more, is very much the outcome of one's capital, be it financial and / or symbolic.

Christian / Muslim
Read against the background of ➪ map I, the Christian / Muslim divide that has marked Beirut since the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) is betrayed by almost all trajectories. Among the Lebanese nationals, it is visible in the forced historical movement of those among us who had to leave their areas of residence during the civil war. It continues to be detectable in the area of residence, which is generally still in line with one's religious belonging. Here too, however, the dividing lines aren't sharp and several areas in the city –especially those located along the green line-, are becoming once again religiously mixed. Shopping and entertainment landmarks (e.g. the ABC Mall) and / or districts (e.g. Gemayzeh, Monot) are also visited by members of all religious groups—even if, as residential areas, they continue to act as relatively homogenous zones. Other areas, however, maintain a sharp religious belonging and are neither dwelled nor visited by members of other religious groups.
Interestingly enough, while migrant workers' social status is sharply distinguished from the Lebanese, their religious belonging seems to strongly affect their residential and entertainment prac-

map J9



09i—I Feel Safe

"One of the things I cherish most about living in Beirut is the sense of safety I have in the city. I walk back home late at night and I never feel threatened. I also often rely on people in the supermarkets and/or stores to care for my children if I have to grab something quickly. This is a main difference with the time I lived in the United-States, when I was always scared if I came back home a little late and I could never leave my children for a second.

The security deployment is of course not what makes me feel safe—to the contrary, I experience it as a continuous harassment, a source of traffic congestion, and as an additional daily negotiation that I could easily do without. It's easier to face it walking then in the car, so I rely more on the stroller and try to avoid driving anytime I can."

Mona Fawaz is author of this document.



09j—Moving in and out

"The short way from where I live to my primary place of work goes through one of the most heavily secured streets in the city. Along the way, I pass by the National Security Headquarters, The French Embassy, three Université Saint Joseph campuses, a police station and two intersections where military tanks have become permanent fixtures anticipating a clash between adjacent Shiite, Sunni and Christian communities. The most obvious consequence of the security deployments protecting these sites is an outrageous increase in traffic congestion. And since this happens on my regular route to and from work, it daily leaves me angry at what I can only see as an unnecessary obstruction to my ability to get to work on time. After all, proximity to the workplace was one of the main reasons I moved to this location. Before that, I used to live in one of the relatively security-less areas in the east of the city, and I moved out in search for a less homogeneous and livelier neighborhood—characteristics that seem to come with a certain price."

Ahmad Gharbieh is author of this document.

tices in the city. This is especially the case when visible religious markers (e.g. a veil ➪ map J3) and/or active membership in one's church group (➪ map J4) anchor the practices of a community in one or another religious zone in the city.
In the absence of actual Christian/Muslim communal violence for twenty years, religious divisions and their impacts on trajectories and urban imprints provide an additional dimension to the notion of safety, that of feeling comfortable among members of one's religious groups (➪ map L). ❑

Informal settlement
Regularly visited area
Palestinian refugee camp
Travel between areas

Residence
Workplace
Visited landmark
Past residence
Past Workplace
Souq
Commercial street
Mall
Supermarket
Cooperation
Church community
chance encounter/ walking around
Café/Restaurant
House visit
Beach resort
Neighbour visit
Hubble Bubble
Dancing
Singing

by night
by day
with stroller
daily
on Sundays
movie theatre
S flat sharing
V volunteer work
F field work
M Megastore









10—TARIQ AL JDIDEH AS THEME PARK

BY MARWAN KAABOUR—GRAPHIC DESIGN FINAL YEAR THESIS, 2009

Marwan Kaabour's thesis project presents a hypothetical situation in Tariq al- Jdideh where a program initiated by Al-Mustaqbal Movement introduces exaggerated security mechanisms in the area, and orchestrates different acts of support for the movement by the inhabitants of this predominantly Sunni neighborhood. As imagined as they may be, each of the components of this scenario responds to a real event or situation. The Lebanese flag curtain on the balconies is an attempt at intensifying and permanently integrating a practice that has been common since 2007 when, in a national televised address, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora called on the Lebanese to raise the flag on their balconies in support for the government. Similarly, the surveillance arguilé is an interpretation of the street corner meeting points of men from the neighborhood, whose primary purpose of assembly is to act as neighborhood watchers, partaking in the dominant security system. This practice is seen in many areas that have this similar kind of autonomous control, especially in times of conflict. The Tariq al-Jdideh "Theme Park" also includes more elaborate readings of the neighborhood's spaces, like the monument proposed to be erected in the central square that turns into a safe platform for the Sunni leader Saad Hariri to deliver speeches in times of public congregation, and an escape route in times of conflict.

The significance of Kaabour's work lies in its ability to bring together the mechanisms of security and the active performance by the community in one well-negotiated framework. The new realm of the theme park is at once that of simulations and that of regulation and control. ❑



fig K1

The flag balcony curtain—a sign of the area's identity and the loyalty of its inhabitants. In times of unrest, it is recommended that the curtain is closed for full impact.



fig K2



Main speaker—picks up general sounds from the vicinity.



Video cameras—rotate covering a range of 360 degrees.



Security arguilé station.

Tiny microphones—pick up conversations within a close perimeter.

Circular public seating area.

Additional arguilés, either fixed or brought in by people.



fig K3

SCENARIO 1:
The main goal for the construction of the tunnel is to organize demonstrations in the Mala'ab Baladi Square. Therefore, the monument serves as a central focal point for congregation. As shown in the opening mechanism, the platform would raise the speaker, probably Shiekh Saad or other Tayyar Mustaqbal personalities. The platform is raise above ground level for security purposes, and would be equipped with protective glass.



SCENARIO 2:
In the situation when the area is under attack. The Tayyar Mustaqbal coordinators would contact the HQ to arrange the opening of the tunnel to be used as an escape route leading to Qoraitem. Qoraitem Palace has been equipped with a large secured underground area to accommodate a large number of people who would escape Tarik El Jdide. However we should emphasize that this the absolute final resort.

map L
—Pious Leisure Sites in al-Dahiya

11—PIOUS MORALITY AND NEW SPATIALITIES

BY MONA HARB & LARA DEEB

This map shows the location size, and date of establishment of cafés and restaurants that abide by "acceptable" piety and morality rules in the southern neighborhoods of Beirut, labeled al-Dahiya (the suburb)—a derogatory term referring to the territory extending south of the municipal boundary of the capital until the Airport, and east towards *Hadath* and *Choueifat*, housing a majority of Shi'i population, and where Hezbollah dominates. "Acceptable" piety and morality rules refer to the lack of alcohol and non-halal meat in these places, in addition to the abidance by behavior that is deemed "controlled" (*madbuta*). These places have been multiplying in *al-Dahiya*, in the aftermath of the liberation of South Lebanon in 2000, and especially after the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006, responding to an increasing market demand of a pious clientele, wary of a particular moral lifestyle, but also interested in consumerism and spending good leisurely time amongst their peers. They are run primarily by private Shi'i entrepreneurs, many of whom are returning migrants who invest their savings in this profitable market. This "pious leisure" phenomenon was instigated by two major stakeholders. In 1998, al-Inmaa' group—a major real-estate developer in *al-Dahiya*—established Fantasy World, a large-scale amusement park, promoting the concept of 'conservative tourism' (*siyaha muhafiza*) in the framework of 'family entertainment'. In 2001, the charitable organization, al-Mabarrat, run by Sayyid Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, a key Shi'i religious figure, established al-Saha Traditional Village, a restaurant complex including shops, a motel and a museum. Both projects attracted a large middle-class clientele who appreciated their piety and morality standards while enjoying their leisurely atmosphere.

These 'pious leisure' places indicate how the notion of urban refuge incorporates morality. Indeed, city spaces are formed and practiced in relation to one's class, religion, gender and race as we have seen in previous maps (➪ maps E, F), but also depend on individual and collective moral norms and values. Beliefs in particular types of social and moral behavior impact spatial production and lifestyles in the city, and translate physically and functionally into distinct types of places, where some practices are legitimized and others criticized—although categories are not fixed and are the subject of spatial and temporal negotiations that transform boundaries. ❑

- Major city
- Small town
- Highway
- Primary road
- Secondary road
- Bridge destroyed
- Road cut
- Airport
- Runway
- Port
- Electric plant
- Vital plant or factory
- Lighthouse
- Media Antenna
- Gas station per disrict

map M1
Transport & Vital Sites Bombed



ISRAELI ASSAULT ON LEBANON

12—SAMIDOUN

Israeli Agression on Lebanon 2006

BY AHMAD GHARBIEH

Shortly after the start of the Israeli assault on Lebanon in the summer of 2006, a group of activists, designers and other concerned individuals spontaneously got together and formed Samidoun. They were driven by a shared need to document the extent of the calculated assault and provide information that traditional media channels were not making available. A mapping of the assault was carried out and daily updates of the maps were regularly posted online and disseminated by e-mail to and by a network of people that was growing by the day. The maps achieved considerable exposure and quickly became primary reference documents, appearing in news programs on TV and in the hands of politicians during press conferences. The success of this alternative media device fuelled the enthusiasm of the group even further. Today, the 2006 initiative stands as the first in a number of other activism projects that were conducted by the grassroots network in similar situations of urgency (➳ www.kharita.wordpress.com).

The decision to include their work from 2006 in this document is not only to show an example of mapping as a tool for change, but also to consider the Israeli outside threat as a major contributor to the constant lack of a real sense of safety in Lebanon. It is important to note that the different episodes of the post-civil-war Lebanese-Israeli tensions—the Grapes of Wrath Operation in 1996, the Liberation of the South in 2000 and the latest 2006 war—have direct consequences on and provoke specific spatial renegotiations in certain areas, of which the most obvious is the transformation of certain sections of Lebanese cities into refuge sites for the displaced. Other examples, in the aftermath of the 2006 assault, include how the control of the southern suburbs by Hezbollah drastically changed from being a blatant enforcement of armed security to a more invisible operation relying almost exclusively on surveillance. Also in the southern suburb, as the ongoing research of Mona Harb and Lara Deeb shows, these events can be seen in direct relation to the pattern with which a very particular entertainment and leisure industry is emerging, one that is defined by religious conformity and moral codes of conduct. These examples are only some of the observations that can be made regarding the effects of the continuous Israeli threat, some of which are less direct but are of equal significance. ❑

Major city
Small town
Highway
Road
Strikes on August 13th
1–5 Strikes
6–15 Strikes
16–30 Strikes
>30 Strikes



map M2

Locations Bombed



ISRAELI ASSAULT ON LEBANON